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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterised by difficulties in social 
communication and interaction alongside repetitive and stereotyped behaviours, interest and 
activities (APA, 2013). We use the terms ‘autism’ and ‘autistic people’ throughout this 
chapter, in-line with recommendations from the autistic community (Kenny et al., 2016). 
Recent reports concerning prevalence rates provide estimates of up to one in 59 children 
having autism (Baio et al., 2018), and autism is reported to cost the US government $175 
billion per year (£32 billion per year in the UK). This is more than any other medical 
condition and greater than the cost of cancer, strokes and heart disease combined, 
highlighting the impact of autism in society and the need for a better understanding about 
how to support autistic people to reach their full potential (Buescher et al., 2014). The criteria 
for diagnosing autism includes a lack of intuitively understanding nuances and rules within 
social interactions and communication, alongside excessively circumscribed interests 
involving perseverative behaviour pursuing specific restricted topics (APA, 2013). An 
interesting aspect of autism is that it is not only associated with deficits, but that it can also 
involve strengths in other areas, and in some cases, talent in certain ‘islets of ability’ (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2009; Happé & Vital, 2009). The weaknesses in autism have been characterised 
as generally pertaining to areas of social functioning, and the strengths to areas of non-social 
functioning. Thus, autistic people can have both relative weaknesses and strengths within 
different domains, making it a paradoxical condition (Baron-Cohen et al., 2011). 
Single factor theories of autism 
There are a number of key psychological theories about autism, most of which focus 
on one specific process or domain. The enhanced perceptual functioning theories (Plaisted et 
al., 2006; Mottron et al., 2006) emphasise greater attention to detail in autism, based on 
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findings from visual search tasks where autistic people show faster detection of local-level 
targets compared to controls (O’Riordan et al, 2001; Plaisted et al., 1998), and in the 
embedded figures task where autistic people are faster than controls to find simple target 
shapes within complex figures (Jollife et al., 1997). The weak central coherence theory (Frith, 
1989; Happe & Frith, 2006) focuses on reduced ability for holistic processing in autism, such 
as deficits in face-processing, which require processing the features in a holistic manner for 
identification and emotion recognition. The weak central coherence theory can also help 
explain the greater local processing in autism, as reduced holistic processing may produce a 
greater reliance on featural processing (or vice versa). Another theory of autism is the 
executive dysfunction theory (Ozonoff et al., 1990; Russell, 1997), which proposes that 
deficits in executive function underlie the difficulties seen in autism. The mindblindness 
theory proposes that people with autism have difficulties in having a theory of mind about 
others (Baron-Cohen, 1990, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), which involves the ability to 
understand the mental states of others and to predict and understand their behaviour based on 
it (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). There is a wealth of evidence for deficits in theory of mind 
in autism, which has been reported across both children and adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993, 
2000, 2013).  
Dual factor theories of autism 
But limitations of all these theories have been raised, including that they largely 
account for either the social or the non-social characteristics of autism, but have difficulties 
accounting for both. Further psychological theories of autism have been developed which 
involve two separate mechanisms, in order to try and better account for both the strengths and 
weaknesses often found in autism. One mechanism is generally related to the social 
weaknesses and another one related to the non-social strengths. For example, one popular 
two-factor framework is the Empathising-Systemising model, which then also relates to the 
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extreme male brain theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2003, 2009, Baron-Cohen et al., 
2011). Within the empathising-systemising theory, empathising involves the drive to 
understand the social world, while systemising involves the drive to understand the non-
social world. Empathising includes recognising the emotions in others and responding to 
them with appropriate behaviour, as well as more cognitive abilities such as reading the 
mental states of others. Systemising, on the other hand, includes processes commonly seen as 
strengths in autism, such as greater attention to detail and more logical thinking. Research has 
shown that females generally do better at measures of empathising compared to males 
(Auyeung et al., 2009; Baron-Cohen, 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2003), such as 
being able to read the mental states of others from images of people’s eye regions (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). In contrast, males generally do better at measures of systemising than 
females (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004; Lawson et al., 2004), such as being able to more quickly 
spot smaller shapes within more complex figures on the embedded figures task (Jolliffe et al., 
1997). Together, this theory proposes that females are more likely than males to have a 
cognitive profile where their empathising ability is higher than their systemising ability, 
while males are more likely to have a cognitive profile where their systemising ability is 
higher than their empathising ability.    
According to the extreme male brain theory, autism is characterised as an extreme of 
the empathising-systemising pattern typically seen in males, with very poor empathising 
alongside intact, or even enhanced, systemising ability compared to typical males and 
females (Baron-Cohen, 2003, 2009; Baron-Cohen et al., 2005). Evidence has shown impaired 
empathising and intact, or enhanced, systemising compared to controls across both 
questionnaire and behavioural assessments (Baron-Cohen, 2003, 2009; Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001, 2004; Lawson et al., 2004). Therefore, autism is theorised to reside at the extreme end 
of a wider continuum of ‘autistic-like traits’, which are continuously distributed across the 
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general population (Constantino & Todd, 2003; Plomin, Haworth & Davis, 2009; Posserud, 
Lundervold & Gillberg, 2006; Wing, 1988). Consistent with this idea of a continuum of 
autistic-like traits, Ruzich et al. (2015) report that males have higher levels of autistic-like 
traits than females within the general population, and those with autism have significantly 
higher autistic-like traits than males from the general population (with no sex differences 
within the autism population). 
A similar two-factor model to the Empathising-Systemising and extreme male brain 
theories was proposed by Badcock & Crespi (2008), which involves the two factors of 
mentalistic and mechanistic processing. Mentalistic processing involves the ability to process 
about people, while mechanistic processing involves the ability to process about ‘things’. The 
theory proposes there are different cognitive continuums for each of these factors, ranging 
from poor to high ability within each process. The relationship between these two factors in 
people is proposed to be related to two extreme profiles associated with different disorders, 
with one end characterised by hypo-mentalistic processing alongside hyper-mechanistic 
processing, and the other end characterised by hypo-mentalistic processing alongside hyper-
mechanistic processing. Similar to the extreme male brain theory, the end of the continuum 
defined by hyper-mechanistic/hypo-mentalistic processing is associated with autism. The 
other end of the continuum characterised by hyper-mentalistic/hypo-mechanistic processing 
is associated with psychosis, leading to an autism-psychosis spectrum model. While there is a 
wealth of research showing difficulties in mentalistic types of processing and strengths in 
mechanistic processing in autism, there has been limited research about the other end of the 
continuum that Crespi & Badcock (2008) associate with psychosis, which in the 
Empathising-Systemising framework would be termed the ‘extreme female brain’. Research 
has explored whether the extreme female brain might relate to a profile with greater 
empathising and reduced systemising (i.e. the opposite pattern to autism and the extreme 
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male brain as predicted by the Empathising-Systemising theory. Brosnan et al. (2010) 
reported that a cognitive profile defined by higher empathising relative to systemising (i.e. 
hyper-mentalistic profile) was related to greater self-reported levels of psychosis in a non-
clinical female population. Further research has found that autistic people who had 
experienced psychosis have higher empathising relative to systemising when compared to 
autistic people without psychosis experiences (Larson et al., 2015). While these initial 
findings are consistent with the autism-psychosis model as a cognitive continuum, there has 
been a dearth of research investigating reasoning ability related to these two-factor models. 
Initial reasoning research  
 Our initial research investigating reasoning and decision-making related to the two 
factor theories examined the opposite end of the proposed cognitive continuum to autism, 
attempting to link the reasoning profile consistently seen in psychosis to measures of 
empathising/systemising, in order to test predictions of the autism-psychosis model. One of 
the most consistent findings in psychosis is a jumping to conclusions reasoning bias, which is 
reported in half or more of clinical people with delusions (Freeman, 2007; Langdon et al., 
2008). One commonly used paradigm to index jumping to conclusions is the beads task. In a 
classic version of the beads task, the participant is presented with 2 jars of beads which have 
different ratios of different coloured beads within them, with one jar typically having 80% 
white beads and 20% black beads and the other jar having 20% white beads and 80% black 
beads. The jars are then covered up and beads are drawn one at a time from one of the two 
jars. The participants’ role in the task is to identify which jar they think the beads are being 
drawn from. The key variable being measured is how many beads are requested before the 
participant feels able to make their decision. A jumping to conclusions bias is evidenced 
when a decision is made after seeing only one or two of the drawn beads.  
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We ran a study to test whether a jumping to conclusions reasoning bias characteristic 
of psychosis might be related to a cognitive pattern involving greater mentalistic/empathising 
processing alongside low mechanistic/systemising processing, consistent with the idea of the 
extreme female brain (Brosnan, Ashwin & Gamble, 2013). For that study we recruited 218 
non-clinical adolescents and adults (48M; mean age = 27.4) without a psychiatric diagnosis 
and used a computerised version of the beads task to measure the jumping to conclusions 
bias. We also included the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2003) as a 
self-report measure of empathising/mentalistic processing, and both the self-report 
Systemising Quotient (SQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003) and the behavioural embedded figures 
task as measures of systemising/mechanistic processing. The SQ scores were subtracted from 
the EQ scores in order to produce an Empathising Bias score for each participant, with higher 
scores reflecting greater empathising relative to systemising ability. Participants were 
classified as showing a jumping to conclusions bias if they made a decision about which jar 
the beads were coming from based on drawing only 1 or 2 beads (n = 68; mean number of 
beads requested = 1.27), and participants who made choices based on more than 1 or 2 beads 
drawn were classified as non-jumping to conclusions (n = 155; mean number of beads 
requested = 7.18). Results of the study showed that the jumping to conclusions group had 
higher Empathising Bias scores compared to the non-jumping to conclusions group, revealing 
a cognitive profile where those who show a jumping to conclusions bias are characterised by 
greater empathising compared to systemising. These results are in-line with ideas that 
enhanced empathising/mentalistic relative to systemising/mechanistic processing relates to 
the reasoning bias consistently reported in psychosis. Additionally, the jumping to 
conclusions group made significantly more errors on the embedded figures test compared to 
the non-jumping to conclusions group, showing that a jumping to conclusions reasoning bias 
relates to reduced attention to detail. Since attention to detail is a trait associated with 
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systemising/mechanistic ability (Brosnan et al. 2012), the results further show that a jumping 
to conclusions bias relates to reduced systemising/mechanistic ability. Together, these 
findings are consistent with the predictions from the autism-psychosis model that a cognitive 
profile characterised by hyper-mentalising relative to lower mechanistic processing relates to 
a jumping to conclusions reasoning bias consistently seen in psychosis.  
The findings from that initial study of reasoning were consistent with the ideas of the 
two-factor models and the extreme female brain theory, with those people showing a bias 
with higher empathising scores relative to systemising scores jumping to conclusions more 
than those displaying the opposite cognitive pattern. The extreme male brain theory would 
predict those with autism should show the opposite reasoning profile to that, with a tendency 
to reason longer towards making a decision in the beads task. While there has been much 
research investigating false belief reasoning in those with autism to date, which relates to 
understanding the mental states of others and has generally shown deficits and delays in the 
development of false belief understanding in autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993, 2000, 2013), 
there has been little research exploring non-social reasoning in autism. This is surprising 
given the importance of general reasoning to everyday human functioning. As Holyoak and 
Morrison (2012: p. 1) stated: “Every fully functioning human adult shares a sense that the 
ability to think, to reason, is a part of their fundamental identity.” If the ideas of the two 
factor theories of cognition above could be utilised to help study reasoning and decision 
making processes, this may help to better characterise and understand the cognitive profile of 
autism. Based on our initial findings (Brosnan et al., 2013) and the two-factor cognitive 
theories outlined above, we predicted for the first time that the opposite reasoning bias which 
is typically reported in psychosis would be evident in autism.  
Initial reasoning research in autism 
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We tested this idea in a group of 20 adolescents with autism (19M; mean age = 14.6) 
and a group of 23 adolescents without autism (15M; mean age = 14.4) recruited as a control 
group (Brosnan, Chapman & Ashwin, 2013). We measured reasoning using the same 
computerised version of the beads task in the study described above (Brosnan et al., 2013), as 
well as a measure of systemising/mechanistic ability and a short form of the social 
responsiveness scale as a measure of autistic-like traits (SRS-short; Kanne et al., 2009). The 
autism group had higher autistic-like trait scores compared to the control group, consistent 
with them having a diagnosis of autism. Since differences in the number of beads required to 
make a decision could relate to how confident people are about their choice, once participants 
made a decision they were also asked about how confident they were about their decision. 
Results in the beads task revealed the autistic group actually required a significantly larger 
number of beads compared to the controls in order to make their decision about which jar 
they thought the beads were being drawn from, demonstrating a more circumspect reasoning 
bias (Brosnan et al., 2013). The greater requests for beads was not due to differences in 
confidence in those with autism, as the groups did not differ in their confidence level about 
their choice. Further results showed that a greater number of beads drawn before a decision 
was positively correlated with the measure of systemising/ mechanistic ability, linking this 
factor of autism with drawing more beads before making a decision. Together, these results 
showed a more circumspect reasoning style in autism, where the autism group gathered more 
data before making a decision.  
Reasoning in autism 
Our initial research therefore indicated that reasoning in autism could be characterised 
by greater systemising/mechanistic reasoning ability, relative to empathising/mentalising 
ability. These findings are consistent with previous neuropsychology research using batteries 
of tests in different domains and reporting reasoning and decision-making difficulties in 
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autistic children and adults in comparison to control groups (Goldstein et al., 2001; Minshew 
et al., 1997; Williams et al., 2006). In addition, difficulties and delays in making decisions by 
autistic people have been reported in research involving observations made by parents and 
teachers (Johnson et al., 2006; Winter, 2003). Adults on the autism spectrum are reported to 
have greater difficulties in making everyday decisions (e.g. when to go to bed, what clothes 
to wear, what to eat etc.) and to make more bad decisions (e.g. purchasing items that were 
never used, being late on rent payments etc.) compared to control adults (Gaeth et al., 2016; 
Levin et al., 2018). A self-report study by Luke et al. (2012) found three core areas of 
difficulty within reasoning and decision-making for people with autism; (1) when it involved 
talking to others; (2) when it involved a change in routine; and (3) when decisions had to be 
made quickly. Whilst the first two relate to the diagnostic criteria for autism, the third issue 
suggests difficulties with rapid processing specifically. Autistic people are also reported to be 
less susceptible to reasoning biases than the general population. One example involves the 
classic framing effect, where people’s decisions between two options depends on how the 
choices are worded and presented (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For example, when 
participants are shown an amount of money, their decision about how to gamble with the 
money is determined by whether its framed in terms of the loss or gain in money within the 
situation (e.g. people are more likely to gamble when the option is framed in terms of money 
lost rather than when its framed in terms of money gained). People with autism are reported 
to show a reduced framing effect bias in terms of using contextual information towards 
decisions (De Martino et al., 2008; Shah et al. 2016), which has been interpreted as showing a 
reduced integration of emotional information into the decision process alongside a greater 
logical and rational decision-making style.  
A study by Mosanyi et al. (2010) examined reasoning heuristics in autism using the 
conjunction fallacy, which happens when people mistakenly assign a higher probability for 
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two events co-occurring compared to either of the events occurring on their own. This is 
incorrect because the likelihood of two independent events occurring at the same time, or in 
conjunction, should be less than or equal to the probability of either event occurring alone. 
For example, in the Linda problem which is commonly used to test the conjunction fallacy, a 
description about Linda is provided that includes statements about her being a smart and 
outspoken woman who majored in philosophy and is concerned about social justice and 
discrimination and who participates in demonstrations etc. Participants are then asked to 
judge some statements about Linda based on how likely they believe them to be, with people 
often believing the statement ‘‘Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement’’ 
to be more likely compared to the statement ‘‘Linda is a bank teller.’’ Despite the fact that the 
likelihood of both events being true about Linda is less than the likelihood for the one event 
being true, yet people still choose the statement with both events because they activate beliefs 
about Linda from her statement. These beliefs are hard to inhibit when making judgments 
about her. Mosanyi et al (2010) found that autistic adolescents were less likely than controls 
to commit the conjunction fallacy and so were less biased in their judgements. While the 
results showed reduced bias in the autism group, which is typically interpreted as intuitive 
processing, their results also showed those with autism were not more rationale in their 
choices compared to controls. The paradigm could separate intuitive and rationale choices, 
and group differences were evident in biased responses but not in rationale choices. Thus, the 
findings were not completely consistent with some of the evidence reported in the studies 
above. But taken all together, the findings suggest the reasoning profile in autism may be 
characterised by a lack of the reasoning biases which are typically exhibited by those in the 
general population, along with difficulties in rapid processing towards decision-making. This 
profile can be best described with the theoretical framework of Dual Process theories, 
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although not all the results across various reasoning studies in autism have been consistent 
with each other to date. 
Dual Process theories 
Dual Process theories are a set of similar theories which provide a framework for 
human reasoning ability and which have been dominant within cognitive psychology for 
almost 50 years (Evans & Frankish, 2009). The various Dual Process theories involve a 
common proposal of two separate types of thinking and reasoning processes, which have 
been termed ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ processing to denote the difficulty of applying a linguistic 
label to them. ‘Type 1’ processing (which is also termed ‘intuitive’ processing) commonly 
includes such characteristics as being autonomous, rapid, effortless, parallel, non-conscious 
and independent of working memory and other higher cognitive ability. ‘Type 2’ processing 
(also termed ‘deliberative’ processing) involves slower, effortful, sequential, conscious 
mechanisms and is heavily dependent on working memory and individual differences in 
general cognitive ability. The dual processes of Type 1 and Type 2 processing will be 
referred to throughout this chapter as intuition and deliberation (respectively) for 
convenience, because these terms are generally more familiar to people. Intuitive processes 
are assumed to yield default responses in most situations, unless they are intervened upon by 
distinctive higher order deliberative processes. This idea that intuitive processes are the 
default response and they precede deliberative processing is known as the ‘default-
interventionist position’ (Evans & Stanovich 2013; Kahneman 2011). Although not all the 
evidence is consistent with these ideas (see the discussion section for further information 




One of the most widely used behavioural assessments of intuition and deliberation is 
the Cognitive Reflections Test (CRT: Frederick, 2005). The CRT comprises of reasoning 
questions which have both an intuitive (incorrect) and a deliberative (correct) response. An 
example question is “A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs a pound more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost?” Most people tend to provide the intuitive answer which 
is 10 pence, however this response is not actually correct. Instead, the correct answer is 5 
pence. People typically provide a majority of intuitive responses to the CRT, which are 
actually incorrect, even when participants are comprised of students at Ivy League 
universities in the USA (Frederick, 2005). This preference for intuitive responding is 
theorised to reflect the output from initial intuitive reasoning which has not been over-ridden 
by deliberative processing. The over-riding of initial intuitive processing by subsequent 
deliberative processing is demonstrated by achieving the correct answer. In support of this, 
experimental manipulations designed to encourage participants to engage in deliberative 
processing reduces intuitive responses (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005).  
The propensity to engage in intuitive and deliberative processing can also be assessed 
through self-report. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) is a widely used 40 item self-
report questionnaire of intuition and deliberation (Epstein et al., 1996). The Rational 
component is used to index deliberative reasoning and contains 20 items that are based upon 
a ’need for cognition’ (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which measures engagement and enjoyment 
of cognitive activities. The Experiential component is used to index intuition and includes 20 
items developed to measure engagement and confidence in one's intuitive abilities (Epstein et 
al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The items are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(completely false) to 5 (completely true). An example item from the experiential/intuitive 
scale is; ‘‘I often go on my instincts when deciding on a course of action’’, while an example 
item from the deliberative scale is; ‘‘I have a logical mind’’. Epstein et al. (1996) argue that 
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these two information processing styles are independent of one another, such that one can be 
high or low in either or both dimension. Singleton et al. (2018) found that a behavioural test 
of logical thinking was best predicted by the self-report deliberation subscale of the REI, but 
not the intuition subscale of the REI nor self-reported scores in systemising. Freeman et al. 
(2012) also found that combinations of high intuition with low deliberation, as measured by 
the REI, best predicted clinically relevant traits (schizotypy) in a general non-clinical 
population.  
Another way to test reasoning styles and biases is through syllogistic reasoning 
problems, and how much people use their prior beliefs in relation to logical processing in 
order to solve them. Syllogistic reasoning tasks typically involve presenting participants with 
two premises followed by a conclusion, and they have to assess if the conclusion is valid 
based on the two preceding premises. There are two aspects that are important about the 
syllogisms, their believability and their logical validity. In some instances, the premises are 
supportive of everyday knowledge and experiences, and so are very believable sounding, and 
so these are considered congruent (e.g. All birds have feathers. Robins are birds. Robins have 
feathers). In other cases, the premises are not very believable sounding, and these are 
considered incongruent (e.g. all mammals walk. Whales are mammals. Whales walk). The 
following is an example of a highly believable syllogism; “All flowers need water. Roses 
need water. Therefore, roses are flowers.” Although the two premises are highly believable, 
the conclusion does not actually follow from them in a logical way. People typically respond 
to that syllogism as being valid, which is thought to reflect an intuitive response (i.e. using 
beliefs rather than the structure of the problem). In contrast, the syllogism “No skyscrapers 
are wooden things. Some buildings are wooden things. Therefore, some buildings are not 
skyscrapers” is both highly believable and logically valid. This creates four different 
combinations of syllogism items: invalid-believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-
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unbelievable, and valid-believable. A ‘Belief Bias’ score is commonly created by subtracting 
the incongruent syllogism scores from the congruent syllogism scores (e.g. Klauer, Musch, & 
Naumer, 2000; Pennycook et al., 2013). A Belief Bias involves people refraining from 
allowing their prior experience and beliefs (i.e. their intuition) to affect their ability to judge 
the logical validity of the syllogism in order to resolve it correctly. However, people often 
incorrectly respond on the basis of the believability (i.e. they use their prior beliefs, or 
intuition) rather than based on its logical structure (i.e. they use deliberation), which results in 
higher Belief Bias scores (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; 
Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989; Pennycook et al., 2013; Roberts & Sykes, 2003; 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006).  
Dual Process Theory of Autism 
The literature described above led to the idea of the ‘Dual Process Theory of Autism’, 
which predicts that people with autism and non-clinical people with high levels of autistic-
like traits should show a cognitive style which involves a combination of higher deliberative 
and lower intuitive reasoning, compared to the typical reasoning responses seen in the general 
population. Thus the Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes that people with autism should 
show a reduced propensity to reason using an intuitive style, alongside a greater propensity to 
use a deliberative style for reasoning. This pattern of reasoning would be expected to result in 
group differences across tasks measuring intuition and deliberation, and since autistic-like 
traits are distributed across the wider population, the theory further predicts that the degree of 
autistic-like traits should also predict how much people engage in deliberative and intuitive 
reasoning (i.e. negative/positive correlations between the degree of autistic-like traits and 
intuitive/deliberative responses respectively). Based on the Dual Process Theory of Autism, 
people diagnosed with autism and people with higher autistic-like traits in the general 
population should also be less likely to show a Belief Bias, as well as other biased responses 
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that reflect using prior knowledge and beliefs over structural information or other information 
about the current problem at hand.   
We initially tested the ideas of the Dual Process Theory of Autism across two studies 
using different measures of reasoning in separate samples (Brosnan, Lewton & Ashwin, 
2016). In study 1, we recruited 95 people (43 M; Mean age = 21) without a diagnosis of 
autism to investigate the relationship between the degree of autistic-like traits in a non-
clinical sample and deliberative and intuitive reasoning. All participants completed the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) to measure the degree of autistic-
like traits, along with the REI self-report measure for deliberative (rationale) and intuitive 
(experiential) reasoning. The participants were split into 4 different groups based on their REI 
scores across both the intuitive and deliberative scales; a high deliberation/low intuition 
group, a high deliberation/high intuition group, a low deliberation/low intuition group, and a 
low deliberation/high intuition group. Results showed the group with a combination of high 
deliberation and low intuition scores had a significantly higher number of autistic-like traits 
compared to the group with a combination of high intuition and low deliberation. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that a higher number of autistic-like traits would 
relate to a pattern of reasoning characterised by high deliberation and low intuition (and 
opposite to the of schizotypy, Freeman et al., 2012 – see above). 
We further tested the idea that autism is characterised by greater deliberation and 
reduced intuition in Study 2 (Brosnan, Lewton & Ashwin, 2016). For this study we recruited 
17 males with autism (mean age = 18.4) and 18 males without autism as the control group 
(mean age = 19.5), with both groups matched on age. Intuition and deliberation were 
measured once again using the REI, as well as with the CRT task which includes questions 
that index intuitive and deliberative responding (see above). Results for the CRT revealed 
that the autism group had significantly more correct responses (which are presumed to reflect 
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deliberative responses) and significantly fewer incorrect responses (specifically those which 
are presumed to reflect intuitive responses) compared to the control group. Furthermore, 
within-group analyses of the CRT scores revealed that the pattern of correct versus incorrect 
scores within the autism group showed a more extreme pattern than that seen within the 
control group. That is, the mean number of incorrect scores for those with autism were far 
lower compared to the mean number of correct responses, while the control group showed 
less extreme differences between their mean correct and incorrect scores. Together, this 
pattern of responding in the autism group is presumed to reflect both lower intuitive 
responding and higher deliberative responding compared to the controls. Results for the REI 
revealed that the autism group had significantly lower levels of self-reported intuitive scores 
and marginally significantly higher self-reported deliberative scores compared to the control 
group. These findings are consistent with other research showing less reliance on 
intuitive/experiential processing on adults on the autism spectrum (Gaeth et al., 2016; Levin 
et al., 208). Taken together, these results across two different studies and using different 
reasoning measures provides compelling evidence for the Dual Process Theory of Autism, 
which proposes that autism is characterised by reduced intuitive and enhanced deliberative 
reasoning (Brosnan & Ashwin, 2018; Brosnan et al., 2016). 
    However, the study by Brosnan et al. (2016) did not include a measure of general 
cognitive ability, in order to test cognitive ability in relation to reasoning and the degree of 
autistic-like traits (Study 1), and for comparison between the autism and control groups 
(Study 2). Since general cognitive ability has been argued within Dual Process theory to 
relate to deliberative, but not intuitive reasoning, the previous results may potentially be 
explained by differences in general cognitive ability in those with autism or in relation to the 
degree of autistic-like traits. A further study (Brosnan et al., 2017) was run in a sample of 
people with and without autism and including a measure of general cognitive ability, along 
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with the CRT as an index of intuitive and deliberative reasoning and the AQ as a measure of 
autistic traits. According to the Dual Process Theory of Autism, the autism group should 
show a reduced number of incorrect responses (thought to index intuition) and a greater 
number of correct responses (thought to reflect deliberation) compared to controls, even 
when general cognitive ability was controlled for. We recruited 26 individuals with autism 
(15M; mean age = 18.3) and 22 individuals without autism as the control group (11M; mean 
age = 17.9). Neither the ratio of males and females nor the mean ages differed between the 
groups. A MANOVA was run on the CRT data with sex and general cognitive ability used as 
covariates and results revealed that the autism group made significantly fewer incorrect 
responses (presumed to reflect intuitive processing) compared to the control group, with no 
significant group differences were found for correct responses (presumed to reflect 
deliberative responses). Additionally, there were not any significant effects found for either 
of the covariates, which included general cognitive ability. The CRT data was then pooled 
together across both groups to increase the power, while controlling for sex and group. 
Correlation results on this larger sample revealed a significant negative correlation between 
the number of autistic-like traits (i.e. AQ scores) and number of incorrect responses (i.e. 
intuition), and a significant positive correlation between the number of autistic-like traits and 
correct responses (i.e. deliberation). No significant relationships were found between general 
cognitive ability and number of either correct or incorrect responses in the analyses. These 
results once again showed that a higher number of autistic-like traits was related to a pattern 
of reduced intuitive and enhanced deliberative processing, and that these results are not 
explained by general cognitive ability or by sex (Brosnan et al., 2017). In situations where 
people are given a problem to solve (e.g. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs a 
pound more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?), people who have higher autistic-
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like traits tend to be less likely to provide the more commonly given but incorrect answer 
(e.g. 10 pence), and are more likely to provide a correct response (e.g. 5 pence).   
We further tested the Dual Process Theory of Autism by investigating the relationship 
between the degree of autism traits in a non-clinical sample and intuitive and deliberative 
processing as measured using a syllogistic reasoning task (Lewton, Ashwin & Brosnan, 
2018). We also included the CRT in the study as a further measure of intuitive and 
deliberative reasoning, and the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices as a measure of 
general cognitive ability. We hypothesised that higher levels of autistic-like traits would be 
associated with reduced belief-bias based responses (presumed to reflect intuitive processing) 
and enhanced logic-based responses (presumed to reflect deliberative processing) when 
controlling for general cognitive ability. We further expected that general cognitive ability 
would relate to deliberative processing, but not intuitive processing. We recruited a total of 
189 British adult participants aged between 18 and 62 years (103M; mean age = 27.3), with 
all the participants either in full-time education or full-time employment and none of the 
participants reporting a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. All participants completed the AQ 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) as a measure of the degree of autistic-like traits, and the CRT and 
a syllogistic reasoning task (Kokis et al., 2002) in order to index intuitive and deliberative 
reasoning (measures explained above). Results with the CRT showed that a higher degree of 
autistic-like traits in the non-clinical sample related to reduced incorrect responses (reflecting 
intuitive reasoning) and greater correct responses (reflecting deliberative reasoning). In 
addition, a higher number of autistic-like traits related to greater accuracy on the incongruent 
syllogisms and a reduced Belief Bias score (incongruent – congruent syllogism responses), 
both of which are proposed to index deliberative reasoning. When people are given a 
syllogism for which beliefs and logic conflict, such as: “All flowers need water. Roses need 
water. Therefore, roses are flowers.”, people who have higher autistic-like traits tend not to 
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rely on beliefs and instead correctly judge that the conclusion is not logically valid. In 
contrast, people who have lower autistic-like traits tend to answer incorrectly, based on their 
beliefs. Together, the results using two different measures once again reveal findings 
consistent with the Dual Process Theory of Autism, with a higher degree of autistic-like traits 
related to greater deliberative and reduced intuitive reasoning. Together, the results indicate 
that high levels of autistic-like traits are associated with a greater tendency for deliberative 
(Type 2) processing to over-ride the initial intuitive (Type 1) processing. 
Implications of the Dual Process Theory of Autism  
Results with the CRT task revealed the autism group had reduced incorrect responses 
(thought to represent intuitive reasoning) and greater correct responses (thought to represent 
deliberative reasoning) compared to controls. Therefore, people with autism were more 
correct and showed less susceptibility to the typical reasoning biases causing which typically 
lead people to choose intuitive, but wrong, answers. The intuitive biases (including the Belief 
Bias) are thought to occur through the automatic use of rapid and effortless processes 
involved with intuition, as opposed to the more engaging and effortful deliberative 
processing. According to Kahneman (2011), the intuitive responses on the CRT that people in 
the general population more readily utilise can be viewed as ‘lazy thinking’. In contrast, 
autistic people have a propensity for not being lazy thinkers or cognitive misers (see Brosnan 
et al. 2016). From this viewpoint, the greater deliberation seen in autism and people with high 
autistic-like traits is best characterized as being ‘unbiased’, or less influenced by context. 
This view is consistent with the views of others that propose the characteristics of autism 
represent a different “style” of information processing, rather than a deficit (Frith, 1989; 
Happé, 1999). Since Dual Process theories are thought to reflect a style rather than strict 
ability, the Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes that autism involves a different style of 
reasoning and decision-making, rather than a reasoning deficit per se. This different style of 
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reasoning is biased towards deliberative responses, and is less susceptible to potentially 
erroneous biases (Brosnan & Ashwin, 2018; Brosnan et al. 2016, 2017; De Martino et al. 
2008; Shah et al., 2016). In experiments involving participants with and without autism and 
measuring intuitive and deliberative responses (e.g. the REI or the CRT), this type of 
reasoning style in autism is predicted to show group differences, with the autism group 
showing reduced intuitive responding alongside greater deliberative responding. This may be 
in the form of having fewer incorrect and more correct answers or scoring lower on items 
measuring intuitive cognitions and behaviours, and higher on items measuring deliberative 
cognitions and behaviours. When measuring the degree of autistic-like traits (in either 
nonclinical or autistic samples), higher levels of autistic-like traits is predicted to be 
positively related to higher deliberative responding and negatively related to intuitive 
responding, as measured by questionnaire items, number of correct answers, or use of 
contextual/item information etc.       
Reduced intuition in autism might be beneficial in some situations, but more 
detrimental in other contexts. It is argued that effective social communication and interaction 
is typically supported by the more rapid, automatic and effortless intuitive processing that 
helps to promote prosocial behaviour, such as cooperation (Rand et al. 2012). Despite the 
susceptibility to bias and error inherent to intuitive processing and the benefits of deliberative 
processing, intuition can be invaluable, and even necessary, in many instances requiring 
quick reasoning and decision making. This is especially true during dynamic social 
interactions in real life situations. Many of the social and emotional processes supporting 
prosocial behaviour are associated with intuitive processing because they involve rapidly 
changing situations requiring quick judgments and responses (Evans and Stanovich 2013; 
Rand et al. 2012). A reasoning bias characterized by reduced intuition may underlie the social 
difficulties consistently seen in autism. Consistent with this idea, Mendelson et al. (2016) 
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suggested that a slower, inefficient, social information processing speed specifically underlies 
many of the social deficits commonly seen in autism, such as the ability to develop and 
maintain friendships. As noted by Darius (2002: p. 25): “There is no such thing as adequate 
delayed social reactions. One is either quick enough to keep up, or one is weird and socially 
disabled.” Rapidly and automatically extracting emotional information from social 
environments is argued to be an intuitive process that feeds “downstream” empathy processes 
and related social-emotional functioning (Kahneman 2011). Thus, the unbiased use of 
deliberation proposed by the Dual Process Theory of Autism may relate to the social-
emotional weaknesses which form part of the diagnostic criteria for autism. The “gut 
feelings” that can produce a rapid and automatic sense of danger about someone else are part 
of the intuitive processes, and can produce behaviours that help to minimise the risk of being 
bullied, exploited, or harmed (e.g. see Maïano et al., 2016). Deliberative processing is less 
likely to produce this automatic gut feeling about potentially dangerous individuals, and 
instead might even result in greater data gathering about them and, therefore, even more 
social interaction. This scenario could result in greater vulnerability to social harm in autism. 
A bias in reasoning and decision-making in autism characterised by greater 
deliberation and reduced intuition could have important academic implications, such as for 
those attending higher education. Students with autism attending college and university might 
need support to facilitate their learning and assessment based on their reasoning style, such as 
extra time during exam sessions and for completing and handing in assignments, in order to 
accommodate greater deliberation and longer times to make decisions. They may also benefit 
from lectures being filmed so they can watch and think about them over a longer period of 
time, as they may not intuitively understand everything during the lecture period. This would 
allow them to personalise the speed of processing of the lecture material to suit their thinking 
style. Slowing down information to allow longer processing has been shown to help people 
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with autism. For example, physically slowing down incoming social-emotional information 
for children with autism has been shown to enhance the ability to recognise the emotions of 
others and to produce greater social-emotional imitation (Laine et al., 2011; Tardif et al. 
2007). Therefore, the cognitive style of those with autism might not be suited to learning and 
decisions-making within many typical forms of university working and assessment situations, 
which often require fast and dynamic information processing. These include such common 
procedures as group work assignments, oral assessments, viva defences, and unseen exams 
etc. According to the Dual Process Theory of Autism, support designed to facilitate a more 
deliberative reasoning style within these types of situations would help the performance and 
success of students with autism at higher education, where they often struggle compared to 
other students. 
The Dual Process Theory of Autism also proposes a relative bias towards deliberative 
processing, which may also provide an account of the strengths associated with autism in the 
literature such as pattern recognition and attention to detail (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al. 2009; 
Happé & Vital, 2009). Such capabilities are often highly visual-spatial in nature and have 
been found to correlate with self-report and behavioural assessments of deliberative 
processing, such as the CRT (Brosnan et al. 2014). It seems plausible to speculate that a 
greater attention to detail and appreciation of patterns within incoming data (e.g., visual-
spatial information) would require more conscious processing resources (e.g. working 
memory). The propensity for greater focus and thinking about excessive details in autism 
may underpin the tendency for deliberative processing to override the rapid and automatic 
intuitive thinking, which is faster but also more prone to bias and errors. Such strengths in 
autism around enhanced focus, greater processing of details and error reduction has been 
argued to be advantageous in a wide array of employment context such as computer 
programmers, software design, communications and networking, engineering design, 
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equipment design, mechanics, research, mechanics repair, advanced machines assembly, lab 
technicians, web design, video game design, app designs, accounting, chemistry, engineering, 
statistics, computational art and animation (Grundwag et al., 2017).  
Based on the differences in intuitive and deliberative reasoning and responding in 
autism, there are certain adaptations and support mechanisms within work environments that 
could help facilitate performance and success for autistic people at work. This is important as 
recent reports show that only 16% of autistic adults are in full-time employment, despite 77% 
of autistic adults saying they want to work (APPGA, 2017). There are relevant issues for both 
the initial steps in the hiring practices, as well as for the policies and procedures utilised 
within companies once autistic people are employed. In terms of the initial steps in gaining 
employment, there are often questions on applications and in interviews where people 
intuitively respond in certain ways to positively suit the situation. For example, a common 
question in interviews is “What is your greatest weakness?” People in the general population 
often intuitively know to choose a trait about themselves that displays minimal negativity, 
and which might even put a spin on the situation to reflect a positive attribute. This might be 
that their greatest weakness is being overly perfectionistic, which on the surface conveys 
about a weak personality trait in answer to what was asked, but when reading between the 
lines it also conveys that the candidate is highly concerned about performing to a very high 
level of ability i.e. about being perfect in their work. Instead, autistic people might deliberate 
for a lengthy period when asked this type of question, which during an interview process 
might actually produce a negative impression about them to the interviewers (e.g. perhaps 
that they are having to think amongst a plethora of weaknesses towards an answer). Even if a 
candidate with autism were to consciously deliberate at length about a potential answer to 
that question, it still might not bring a person closer to a suitable answer in that type of 
situation. In fact, it might serve to confuse the candidate further by having to consider 
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numerous different potential answers in a highly pressurised situation, and could actually be 
more likely to lead them to a poor choice in answer to the question. For example, they might 
be overly honest and say they are always late with assignments, which would likely cost them 
the potential job opportunity. Anecdotally, when an autistic interviewee was asked ‘where 
they would like to be in 5 years-time?’, after lengthy deliberation they answered: “at home”.  
Some companies have now started giving alternatives to face-to-face interview 
processes for potential employees with autism, with the initial steps involving written 
correspondence with the company in their own time-scale. For example, using Social Media 
(such as Facebook) allows the time for autistic people time to reflect upon their answers 
before sharing them (Brosnan & Gavin, 2015). This is important as a cost-benefit study of 
employers in companies of people with autism found that they reported no costs to employing 
workers with autism, only benefits (Scott et al, 2017). Perhaps reducing the amount of 
decisions to be made during meetings would be beneficial, in order to allow time for those 
with autism to deliberate on the information and ideas towards making decisions. Similarly, 
accommodations could be made within practice and policies of companies to suit a less 
intuitive and more deliberative reasoning style, for example by reducing time pressure 
conditions and decision-making situations as much as possible. 
Limitations 
 However, not all the results in the studies outlined above were consistent with 
predictions made by the Dual Process Theory of Autism. While reduced incorrect/intuitive 
responses were consistently found throughout our research in those with autism compared to 
controls and in relation to higher degrees of autistic-like traits, the findings did not always 
show enhanced correct/deliberative responses in those with autism or in relation to higher 
degrees of autistic-like traits. For example, in the study by Brosnan et al. (2017) no group 
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differences were found for correct/deliberative responses using the CRT, although the rest of 
the findings in that study were consistent with the Dual Process Theory of Autism. 
Furthermore, the group differences for rationale responses on the REI in the study by 
Brosnan et al. (2016) were only marginally significant. Together, these non-significant 
findings for greater deliberative/rationale responses in autism are in line with previous reports 
of a lack of group differences in rationale/deliberative responses in the study of heuristic 
reasoning in adolescents with autism by Morsanyi et al. (2010). One possible explanation 
why greater deliberative responses in autism are not always found in reasoning studies is 
there are weaker effect sizes when comparing deliberative compared to intuitive measures. In 
the study by Brosnan et al. (2017) there were no group differences found for correct 
responses in the CRT, which is thought to measure deliberative processes. However, when 
the data for both groups was pooled together to increase power, significant effects were then 
found that revealed a higher degree of autistic-like traits was related to higher 
correct/deliberative responses on the CRT. So it may be that sufficiently large numbers of 
participants and data are needed to generate enough power for statistical effects to be evident 
in autism when investigating differences/relationships involving deliberative measures, while 
there are greater effect sizes for differences in intuitive responding in people with autism 
versus controls.  
It may also be that autism and higher-levels of autistic-like traits relate to the 
propensity to engage in deliberative processing, rather than the ability to engage in 
deliberative processing. It seems feasible that autistic-like traits (which autistic people are 
high in) impact upon the propensity to engage in deliberative processing and cognitive ability 
impact upon the ability to obtain the correct response (Brosnan et al., 2017; Lewton et al., 
2018). Relatedly, an important consideration is the extent to which measures such as the CRT 
assess intuition, given that intuitive responses are incorrect (albeit in a pre-specified way). 
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Pennycook et al. (2015) argue that the CRT may assess the propensity to engage in intuitive 
processing, rather than being a measure intuitive ability. 
 There have also been some issues raised about Dual Process theories, which have 
questioned their effectiveness to explain results and ideas about reasoning and the underlying 
mechanisms, which will be briefly discussed. One issue concerns whether there are actually 
two different processes involved in reasoning, or just one process that is implemented at 
different points in time during information processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Osman, 
2013; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018). In fact, some believe that a single theory of reasoning may 
be sufficient to explain the research findings (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2013). 
There is evidence that intuitive processes can sometimes be slow, and deliberative processes 
can sometimes be fast (Trippas et al., 2017), and also some research has reported that 
intuitive processes can be correct and deliberative processes can be incorrect (Pennycook et 
al., 2018). These findings question some of the factors typically used to separate intuitive 
from deliberative processing and provide support for the Dual Process idea. However, others 
contend that factors such as speed and accuracy are related to each other, but that they are not 
necessarily central factors for differentiating between intuitive and deliberative processing 
(Evan & Stanovich, 2013; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018).  
The issue of whether there are one or two reasoning systems has implications for the 
Dual Process Theory of Autism, which is proposed based upon the idea about there being two 
separate systems, one for intuition and one for deliberation. Since people with ASD often 
take longer to respond than controls in general on different types of experimental tasks and 
when making decisions (e.g. Baisch et al., 2017; Luke et al., 2012), if there was only one 
system then longer response times in autism might create the impression of greater 
deliberative responding, but might simply reflect longer latencies for information processing 
in general. This general tendency for longer responses in ASD would make it more difficult 
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for them to respond intuitively and create a bias towards longer and more accurate processes 
in some contexts. However, the longer responding in autism might not necessarily reflect 
greater deliberative processes or the over-riding of intuition by deliberation, but instead might 
simply be a consequence of differences in general information processing. This could be a 
potentially important line of further research to test the Dual Process Theory of Autism, 
particularly given the issues about the default interventionist view within the reasoning field, 
which states that intuitive responses are the default response unless acted upon by 
deliberative processes. These issues include about how conflict detection occurs between the 
two systems, the possible underlying mechanisms, and contrary evidence such as findings 
where people who provide an intuitive response appearing to detect conflict (De Neys, 2012; 
De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; 
Pennycook et al., 2018).  
Questions and future directions 
While a strong line of evidence now supports the predictions made by the Dual 
Process Theory of Autism, the nature of the mechanisms involved and how they are different 
in those with autism remains unclear, as well as about how the pattern of strengths and 
weaknesses in reasoning tie in with other theories of autism (e.g. key two-factor models). 
Whilst empathising has been found to relate to traditional personality measures of 
agreeableness, systemising has no such correlates (Nettle, 2007). Since previous research has 
shown associations between systemising and deliberative responses (Brosnan et al., 2014), it 
may be that systemising/mechanistic processing shares a strong overlap with deliberation. Or 
that a strong drive to systemise may involve a higher tendency for conscious deliberative 
thought in order to analyse the details and detect consistencies and patterns. While the Dual 
Process Theory of Autism proposes that autism and high levels of autistic-like traits involve a 
propensity to engage in more deliberative processing, this does not necessarily mean the 
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deliberative processing will necessarily reflect higher ability, i.e. that greater deliberative 
processing will always produce better reasoning ability and outcomes. Since reasoning 
‘abilities’ are more closely related to measures of general cognitive ability, an interesting 
question is whether the difference in reasoning style would be evident across the entire 
autism spectrum, including those with intellectual disabilities. Much of the research in autism 
has been carried out with people who do not have an intellectual disability, despite 
intellectual disability being a highly co-occurring condition with autism. We would predict 
that those with autism and intellectual disability would have a propensity to engage in 
deliberative processing over intuition, but the effectiveness of such processing would be 
influenced by further factors, such as impaired general cognitive ability. Similarly, the vast 
majority of research has been conducted upon autistic males, with research lacking on autistic 
females. Whilst we would predict that autistic females will show the same pattern of a 
tendency to engage in deliberative processing according to the Dual Process Theory of 
Autism, this needs to be empirically tested. 
The Dual Process Theory of Autism also proposes that autonomous and rapid intuitive 
processing is either impaired or is not spontaneously utilised in autism, but it does not 
directly specify difficulties in social-emotional processing. Instead, many types of social-
emotional processing represent very salient examples of intuitive processing, or processes 
that rely on strong intuition. Social heuristics are underpinned by intuition (Rand et al., 2012) 
which promote cooperation and pro-social behaviour. Thus, the Dual Process Theory of 
Autism proposes that deficits in engaging in intuitive processing result in decreased 
application of social heuristics. This may relate to a perceived lack of agreeableness, which 
has been found to correlate with empathising (Nettle, 2007). Thus a bias away from intuitive 
processing may have consequences which include difficulties with rapid emotion processing 
and a bias away from pro-social behaviour – but not a deficit in empathy per se (although 
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emotion recognition tasks are often used as an index of empathising). This idea is distinct 
from the two-factor models, which explicitly propose a deficit in the empathising/mentalising 
mechanisms. However, while other two-factor models have trouble explaining patterns of 
strengths and weaknesses and intact abilities within social-emotional processing for those 
with autism, the Dual Process Theory of Autism predicts that greater difficulties should 
emerge in autism for faster and more automatic social-emotional processes that involve 
higher intuition, and that fewer difficulties should be evident for social-emotional processes 
requiring less intuition. Similarly, not all systemising/mechanistic processing requires strong 
deliberation, which may also help explain similar profiles of strengths and weaknesses within 
non-social processing in autism. Future research needs to explore these distinctions between 
theories related to the involvement of deliberation and intuition in various social and non-
social abilities in autism. 
Many questions remain concerning the underlying mechanisms related to the 
reasoning differences in autism, as there are different potential causes for these differences. 
One possibility is that the mechanisms for intuitive reasoning are impaired in autism, 
resulting in deliberation being the default and dominant form of reasoning. If the intuitive 
mechanisms are impaired, this would lead to pervasive deficits in any processing requiring 
rapid and unconscious processing across different domains and functioning, such that even if 
someone with autism tried to utilise intuitive processing, they would have difficulties in 
doing this. An alternative possibility is that the mechanisms for intuitive processing are 
intact, but that autistic people do not typically or spontaneously utilise that specific style of 
reasoning, or that the information processing mechanisms they typically use do not easily 
relate to or involve intuitive mechanisms. This scenario would differ to that above in that 
autistic people would be able to utilise intuitive reasoning in some instances, if necessary, 
because the basic mechanisms would be intact. In both of these scenarios above deliberative 
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processing would dominate within reasoning due to the dysfunction of the typical intuitive 
mechanisms. In contrast, the reasoning differences in autism could reflect dysfunction of the 
mechanisms for deliberation. This could involve either hyper-functioning of these 
mechanisms, or an inability to regulate the deliberative mechanisms appropriately. This 
dysfunction could occur alongside typical functioning of intuition, but in this scenario the 
mechanisms for intuition would be regularly ‘over-ridden’ by the deliberative processes 
which would dominate reasoning. A further possibility is that autism could involve 
dysfunction to both intuitive and deliberative mechanisms simultaneously, with differences 
occurring in both types of processing affecting information processing and producing the 
reasoning style outlined by the Dual Process Theory of Autism. Finally, there may be a 
problem in autism with automatizing behaviour, that is, the flexibility in transitioning 
between deliberation and intuition.  
If a difficulty resides in automatizing social heuristics (intuitive processing), one 
possibility is that autistic people engage in social algorithms (deliberative processing). An 
algorithm is a finite series of steps used to reach a solution, such as a recipe for cooking or 
undertaking arithmetic. In such situations, a likely outcome is highly predictable. Many 
social-world scenarios, however, incorporate elements of chance, time-accuracy trade-offs 
and using approximation. Despite this, Christian and Griffiths (2016) propose some 
algorithms to live by. For example, they discuss the secretary problem; if you advertise for a 
secretary, how many people do you interview to hire the best possible candidate? There are 
rules such as you can only interview one at a time, and you must offer the job immediately 
when you think you have made the right decision. The issue is not which option to pick, but 
how many options to consider. The algorithm applied for an optimum solution in this 
scenario is the ‘look before you leap rule’, which states that you interview the first 37% of 
applicants without offering them the job, then offer the job to the first applicant who is better 
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than those you have previously seen. Christian and Griffiths argue that such an algorithm can 
extend to other aspects of life, such as dating. This ‘optimal stopping’ is concerned with 
choosing the time to take a given action. Because there is always a time cost for people, the 
authors argue that the flow of time turns all decision making into optimal stopping. We saw 
with the beads task earlier, that those with autism stop gathering data before making a 
decision significantly later than non-autistic people. Thus it may be the case that explicitly 
considering optimal algorithms will be useful for autistic people if they are utilising social 
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